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Fluidkey says SigNoz flaws enabled $1.6 million theft

Fluidkey says two flaws in its self-hosted SigNoz logging tool exposed session tokens used to steal about $1.6 million from 52 accounts across six chains.

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Fluidkey says SigNoz flaws enabled $1.6 million theft

Fluidkey says an attacker stole about $1.6 million from 52 accounts after exploiting two flaws in its SigNoz logging tool on Nov. 19. In its incident report, the wallet provider said the attacker used session tokens found in internal logs to prepare unauthorized transfers.

How did the attacker turn log access into transfers?

Fluidkey ran SigNoz, an open-source logging tool, on its own servers. Its version was v0.121.1; Fluidkey says the two flaws were fixed in later versions, v0.141.1 and v0.142.1. The attacker used the flaws to read internal logs from Nov. 12 to Nov. 19. Some of Fluidkey’s services had saved session tokens and viewing keys in those logs.

A session token tells a service that you are logged in. With stolen tokens, the attacker created transfer requests on Fluidkey’s servers, marked them approved and raised two-factor spending limits. The attacker then sent small payments to trigger notifications. When a user opened and unlocked the app, it signed the prepared transfer.

That signing step matters. Fluidkey says users’ private keys stayed on their devices and were not compromised. But opening the app let it sign a transfer that the attacker had prepared using the stolen session token.

What else did the attacker access?

Fluidkey says the theft affected accounts on Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism and Arbitrum. Its review found that logs also exposed personal data linked to 70 accounts: 38 email addresses, 37 names, 17 bank account numbers in IBAN format, 24 postal addresses, four dates of birth and two phone numbers.

The attacker also obtained viewing keys for 54 recently registered accounts. Those keys can reveal an account’s addresses, balances and transaction history, but cannot move funds. Fluidkey said it contacted affected users individually.

What did Fluidkey change after the incident?

Fluidkey took transaction processing offline at 18:05 UTC on Nov. 19. It restored service the next day with version 1.79.22. The company says it ended existing sessions, updated SigNoz, rotated its credentials and made the tool’s query interface unavailable from the public internet.

Its servers now require a user’s own key to authorize a transfer request, so a session token alone can no longer create and approve one. Fluidkey also says it no longer writes session tokens or sensitive data to logs, and now verifies changes to two-factor limits on its servers.

What happens next in the investigation?

Fluidkey says it is tracing the stolen funds with blockchain investigations firm zeroShadow, after receiving help from SEAL 911. It reported the incident to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center and Switzerland’s National Cyber Security Centre. In its report, the company says the investigation is ongoing and it will update its findings. The next signal to watch is that update, including any new details about the attacker or fund recovery.

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